Dual board system under German law by Wooldridge, Frank
The dual board system has undergone some criticismin Germany in recent years, as also have the systemsof paritative (equal) and quasi-paritative
codetermination in the supervisory board. The former
system of codetermination is made applicable to
companies in the coal, iron and steel industries having
more than 1,000 employees by the Works Council Act
1952 and is now declining importance. The quasi-
paritative system of codetermination was introduced by the
Codetermination Act 1976, which does not apply to
companies governed by other codetermination statutes, or
to companies which serve political, trade union, religious,
charitable, scientific or artistic purposes, or which involve
the media (para 1(3) and (4), Codetermination Act 1976).
A further system of codetermination is made applicable to
companies having between 500–2000 employees and
which are not engaged in the coal, iron and steel industries
under the Codetermination Act of 2004 (one third
employee participation statute). Companies having less
than 500 employees do not come within that Act if they are
family controlled. The size of the supervisory board of
companies is regulated by paragraph 95 AktG to the extent
that there are no conflicting provisions in the Coal, Iron
and Steel Codetermination Act 1951 or the
Codetermination Act 1976.
The 1976 Act applies to public and private companies,
limited partnership with shares (Kommanditgesellschaften auf
Aktien), and cooperatives (Genossenschaften) under the 1976
Act. The maximum size of the supervisory board is 20,
where the company has more than 20,000 employees. If
the number of employees is between 2,000–10,000, it is
12, if the number is between 10,000–20,000, it is 16.
(para 7(1), No3, ibid). The supervisory board is regulated
by paragraph 95 AktG to the extent that there are no
conflicting provisions it consists of an equal number of
employees and shareholders representatives. The
chairperson, who is usually a representative of the
employees, has a casting vote (para 31(4),
Codetermination Act 1976). The representatives of the
employees on the board consist of employees of the
company and trade union representatives (para 7(2), ibid).
The election of the employees representative may take
place by a direct method, or through the medium of
delegation.
Under the system of codetermination in the coal, iron
and steel industries, the supervisory board is made up of
an equal number of shareholders, and employees
representatives and an independent chairperson. An
attempt is made by paragraph 4 of the 1951 Act to secure
the neutrality of certain members of the board. The
number of members of the supervisory board maybe 21,
where the company has a share capital of more than 25
million euros. When the Works Councils Act of 1952 is
applicable, the representatives of the employees comprise
one third of the members of the supervisory board (para
76(1), ibid). They are elected by a system of direct and
secret voting (para 76(2), ibid). The rules contained in
paragraph 95 AktG, which are considered below, govern the
number of its members (para 77(1), Works Councils Act
1952).
It has frequently been contended in recent years that
members of supervisory boards may serve on too many 17
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Dual board system under
German company law
by Frank Wooldridge
German Aktiengesellchaften have had a dual board system consisting of a
management and supervisory board (Vorstand and Aufsichtsrat) since 1970.
The present article will outline some of the principal rules contained in the
Aktiengesetz concerning such boards of public companies, and will also make
occasional reference to the German Corporate Governance Code which is
applicable to German listed companies (para 161 AktG): other German public
companies are free to adopt the Code which contains recommendations
(Empfehlungen) which should be complied with, or some explanation be given
for non compliance in the company’s annual report. Other provisions of the
Code contain suggestions, or set out what appears to be the position under
German law governing certain matters. The legal effect of the
recommendations in the Code gives rise to considerable uncertainty.
A
rticle
such bodies, lack adequate experience and devote
insufficient time to their duties. This may be particularly
the case with shareholders’ representatives, who are
elected by the shareholders (para 101(1) AktG). Criticisms
of the paritative systems of codetermination have been
made on the grounds that supervisory boards set up under
the Acts of 1951 and 1976 often discuss employment and
related matters to the detriment of exercising their task of
supervision; that employees representatives on such boards
may be too much influenced by trade unions, and that a
board may be of an unwieldy size, thus inhibiting
meaningful discussion. However, as is the case with the
dual board system, the systems of paritative
codetermination are likely to remain in existence in
Germany in the immediate future. The appointment
dismissal, composition and functions of the boards of a
German public company receives further consideration
below.
THE MANAGEMENT BOARD
Role: appointment and dismissal of members
The management board is entrusted with responsibility
for management (Leitung) of the company by paragraph
76(1) AktG. The board may, according to paragraph 76(2)
AktG consist of one or more persons: if the share capital
exceeds 3 million euros, it shall consist of at least two,
unless the statutes otherwise provide. Managerial
responsibilities (Massnahmen der Geschäftsführung) may not,
in principle, be conferred on the supervisory board. (para
111(4) No 1 AktG.) Nevertheless, paragraph 111(4) No2
AktG stipulates that the statutes or the supervisory board
must provide that specific types of transactions may only be
entered into with the consent of the supervisory board.
However, if the board refuses its consent, the general
meeting may override its decision. The management board
loses its sole responsibility for managing the company
where the latter is subject to the directions of another
company under a control agreement, or is integrated with
a principal company.
The concept of management (Leitung) under German
law appears narrower than that of Geschäftsführung (conduct
of the affairs) used in paragraph 77 of, and elsewhere in,
the Aktiengesetz. The latter concept seems clearly intended
to include management. It would also appear to include
such matters as carrying on strategic planning,
coordinating the work of different departments,
determining important policy matters, the exercise of
controlling functions, and the employment of staff.
The members of the management board are appointed
by the supervisory board for a period of up to five years
(para 84(1) AktG) . Paragraph 5.1.2 of the Corporate
Governance Code understandably recommends a shorter
period of time for first appointments. If the company is
governed by the Coal, Iron and Steel Codetermination Act
1951 or by the Codetermination Act 1976, it follows from
paragraph 13 of the former Act and paragraph 33 of the
latter one that a labour director (Arbeitsdirektor) must be
appointed, who is required to carry on his or her tasks in
cooperation with the other members of the board. The
latter may work on a collegiate basis, but as in many other
countries, divisionalisation is common in Germany,
especially in large undertakings. The number of members
of the board must be at least two (which will include any
Arbeitsdirektor) if the company’s nominal capital is more
than 3 million euros, unless the statutes provide otherwise
(para 76(2)AktG).
Members of the management board must be natural
persons having full legal capacity, and must not have been
convicted of any crime involving insolvency during the past
five years, or have been prohibited from engaging in a trade
or profession where the company’s purpose
(Unternehmensgegenstand) partly or wholly involves the
prohibited activity (para 76(3) AktG). A member of the
supervisory board may not be a member of the
management board, or the permanent deputy of a member
of that board (para 105(1) AktG). However, according to
paragraph 105(7) AktG, the supervisory board may appoint
certain of its members as deputies for absent or
incapacitated members for a stipulated period which must
not exceed one year. Such persons may not serve on the
supervisory board during the relevant period (para 105(2)
AktG).
The supervisory board may only revoke an appointment
to the management board, or to the chair of such a board
for good cause. This is treated by paragraph 84(3) AktG as
present where there has been a serious breach of duty by a
board member or such a member is unable to carry on the
affairs of the company; or the general meeting has
expressed its lack of confidence in him, unless such a vote
of no confidence is motivated by clearly arbitrary reasons.
Such revocation may be challenged in the courts (para
84(3) AktG). Where the company is subject to the Coal,
Iron and Steel Codetermination Act 1951, it follows from
paragraphs 13(1) and (2) of that Act that the labour
director cannot have his appointment terminated (not
indeed be appointed) unless the majority of the employees’
representatives on the supervisory board vote in favour of
such action.
Rules governing management and representation
Paragraphs 77 and 78 AktG contain rules governing the
management and representation of public companies. The
management board of a public company represents that
company both in and out of court. Unless the statutes
otherwise provide, the conduct of the company’s affairs
and its representation in relation to outsiders is entrusted
to the management board, acting jointly. It commonly
happens that the conduct of the company’s affairs and its
representation is entrusted to one or more members of the
board, or to one member acting together with an
authorised agent called a Prokurist. Sometimes the statutes18
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or the company’s by-laws (Geschäftsordnung) may give a
particular member of the board, frequently the chairman,
the right to block a decision, sometimes with a temporary
effect. While a company is subject to the Codetermination
Act 1976, the grant to a right to permanently block a
decision may be incompatible with the position given to
the labour director under paragraph 33 of the Act.
The chairperson is frequently given a casting vote. The
names of members of the management board are required
to be entered in the Commercial Register by paragraph 81
AktG.
Remuneration and participated in profits
Profit participation by members of the management
board is governed by paragraph 86 AktG. Their
remuneration is dealt with (perhaps somewhat sketchily)
by paragraph 87, and there are a number of
recommendations concerning such remuneration in
paragraphs 4.2.2–4.2.4 of the Corporate Governance
Code. A considerable number of amendments to the
Code’s provisions concerning remuneration were made in
2003. According to paragraph 87 AktG, the supervisory
board is required to ensure that the aggregate
remuneration of any member of the management board
bears a satisfactory relationship to the duties of such a
member, and the position of the company. The same rule
is made applicable by way of analogy to pensions, payments
to surviving dependants and comparable payments.
Remuneration may be reduced by the Court on the motion
of the supervisory board if its payment to a member of the
management board would result in serious hardship for the
company. It is noteworthy that paragraph 4.2.4 of the
Corporate Governance Code recommends the disclosure
of the remuneration of the members of the management
board subdivided into fixed, performance related and long-
term incentive payments, which should be individualised in
the notes to the accounts. This recommendation has not
generally been complied with by large companies, and the
present matter may come to be regulated by a specific
statutory provision. If companies do not comply with the
relevant Code provision in the future.
Duties and liabilities
Paragraph 88(1) AktG provides that unless the
supervisory board gives its consent, members of the
management board may neither engage in any trade nor
enter into any transaction in the same field of business as
that company either on their own behalf or on that of
others. As far as listed companies are concerned, the above
rule is supplemented by those of paragraph 4.3.1–4.3.5 of
the Corporate Governance Code consuming conflicts of
interest. Thus, for example, paragraph 4.3.1 of the Code
provides that during their employment for the enterprise,
members of the management board are subject to a
comprehensive non-competition obligation, whilst
paragraph 4.3.5 provides that members of the supervisory
board shall take in subsidiary activities especially
supervisory board mandates outside the undertakings only
with the approval of its supervisory board. The extension
of credit to members of the management board and their
spouses, partners or minor children also requires the
approval of the supervisory board. Credit extended in
violation of these provisions has to be repaid immediately,
unless the supervisory board subsequently consents (para
89, AktG).
The supervisory board and its chairperson have
extensive rights to receive reports on a number of matters
set out in paragraph 90 AktG, which was amended by the
Control and Transparency Act 1998 (BGBl 1.1998,786).
Such reports concern (inter alia) the intended business
policy of the company and other fundamental matters
relating to its future strategy, and in particular, its finance,
investment and personnel plans. The management board is
also required to report on transactions which may have a
significant impact on the profitability or solvency of the
company, and report also on subsidiary companies. As far
as listed companies are concerned, paragraph 34 of the
Corporate Governance Code provides that the
management board informs the supervisory board
regularly, without delay, and comprehensively of all issues
important to the enterprise with regard to planning
business developments, risk situations or risk
developments. The management board points out
deviations of the actual business development from
previously formulated plans and targets, indicating the
reasons therefore. This provision appears intended to
specify the existing legal position, and not to constitute a
recommendation.
Paragraph 91(1) AktG provides that the management
board shall ensure that the necessary account books are
kept. The board is required by paragraph 91(2) to take
suitable measures for the early recognition of development
endangering the future existence of the company.
The management board is responsible for calling
meetings of the company, which may also be called at the
request of a minority holding at least one-twentieth of the
nominal capital (paras 121 and 122 AktG). The board is
required to call a meeting if it becomes evident from an
annual or interim balance sheet that the company has
suffered a loss equal to one half of its nominal capital. The
management board is required to file a petition for
insolvency proceedings without delay and must apply to the
court within three weeks of the company’s becoming
unable to make payments when due or becoming over-
indebted (Überschuldet) (para 92(2) AktG). Over-
indebtedness is deemed to occur when a company’s
liabilities are no longer covered by its assets.
The provisions of paragraph 92 AktG concerning the
duty of care and liability of members of the management
board are complex and have given rise to some controversy.
Paragraph 93(1) provides that in conducting business the 19
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management board shall exercise the care of a diligent and
conscientious manager. They shall not disclose confidential
information or secrets of the company, especially trade or
business secrets of which they have become aware by
reason of their service on the management board. The
general clause in paragraph 93(1) sentence 1 AktG is
thought to be applicable to all the duties of directors, for
example in relation to their managerial responsibilities,
their fiduciary duties and duties imposed on them by
specific provisions of the Aktiengesetz (note for example
paras 80,81,83,88,91(2) and 92 thereof). The standard is
not that of an ordinary businessman, but that of a person
in a responsible and leading position as the manager of
other persons property in a particular undertaking. The
standard is an objective one, and inability or inexperience
are not treated as excuses. A member of the management
board of a company who has particular functions allotted
to him under the statutes or otherwise is not only
responsible for his own sphere of activity, but he is also
expected to exercise supervision over his fellow directors.
Paragraph 93(1) sentence 2 AktG applies to all the
members of the management board, including the labour
director (Arbeitsdirektor) if any, as well as, deputies
appointed by the supervisory board under paragraph
105(2) AktG. It applies to processes of manufacture of
production, financial planning, regular customers, and
important decisions relating to employees. A general clause
concerning the liability of members of the management
board is contained in paragraph 93(2) AktG. This provision
stipulates that members of the management board who
breach their duties shall be jointly and severally liable to the
company for any resulting damage. If there is a dispute as
to whether or not they have employed the standard of care
of a diligent and conscientious manager, they shall bear the
burden of proof. Damage is presumed to be caused in the
nine situations set out in paragraph 93(3) AktG.
If a company brings an action under paragraph 93 it will
be required to produce evidence of acts of the directors
which have caused damages; as already indicated, damage is
presumed to have occurred in the special cases set out in
paragraph 93(3) AktG, but in other cases the company must
be shown by the plaintiff to have been suffered by reason
of act or omission of a director which may be a breach of
duty to the satisfaction of the court. According to some
writers, the reversal of the normal burden of proof under
German law only requires the defendant director to show
that he has not been guilty of subjective fault, ie conduct
deserving of blame; however the predominant opinion
seems to be that the defendant has also to demonstrate that
he has exercised the necessary care (see the discussion in
Lutter and Hommelhoff, GmbH Gesetz, 15th ed., pub.
Verlag Dr Otto Schmidt, Köln 2000, p 683). According to
an article by Goette in Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 1945
(at p648) which has frequently been cited, the director
may escape liability by demonstrating that he has fulfilled
his duties, or has been responsible for subjective fault, or
that the damage would still have been suffered if he had
performed his duties. In the Arag Garmenbeck case (BGHZ
134,24) the Supreme Court held that the directors are not
liable if they acted in the interests of the company and on
the basis of adequate information.
According to paragraph 93(4) AktG, the liability of
members of the managing board is not excluded by the
approval of a transaction by the supervisory board, but it is
excluded if the transaction was approved by a lawful
resolution of the shareholders’ meeting. Paragraph 93(5)
AktG permits the claim of the company to be asserted by
the company’s creditors if they are unable to obtain
satisfaction from the company.
THE SUPERVISORY BOARD
Appointment and dismissal of members
As explained above, the task of the Aufsichtsrat is to
supervise the management board and in principle,
managerial tasks may not be conferred on it. Except where
there are conflicting provisions in one of the
Codetermination Acts the board must comprise three
members, unless the statutes provide for a higher number,
which must be divisible by three. The maximum number of
nine if the capital is 1,500,000 euros or less; 15 if the
capital is more than 1,500, 000 euros; and 21 if it exceeds
10,000,000 euros. The special rules contained in the
Codetermination Acts have been considered above.
Under the system of codetermination governed by the
1967 Act, the method of election of employees’
representatives is very complex. The numbers of
employees and shareholders representatives, which are
equal, vary in accordance with the size of the workforce.
The representatives of the employees in the supervisory
board always include some representatives of a trade union
represented in the company, or in another company whose
employees participate in the election of the employees
representatives in the board of the former company. There
are basically two types of election. If the undertaking has
less than 8,000 employees, direct elections take place,
unless the employees who are qualified to note down that
if the election shall take place through the medium of
delegates (para 9(2), Codetermination Act 1976). If the
undertaking has more than 8,000 employees the election
will take place through the medium of delegates
representing the employees unless employees qualified to
vote decide upon direct election (para 9(1), ibid). A vote on
the question of the method of election must be requested
by a motion signed by one twentieth of the workforce of
the undertaking. The relevant decision must be taken by at
least half the workforce qualified to vote. The ballot is
secret (para 9(3), ibid). Voting takes place by a system of
proportional representation, unless only one nomination is
made, when the candidates are chosen by a majority vote.
In such a case, the number of candidates must be twice the
member of vacant seats (paras 15 and 18, ibid).20
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The trade union representatives are chosen by means of
a secret ballot of delegates representing the employees. The
candidates may be nominated by the trade unions
represented in the undertaking or in other undertakings
which belong to the same group as the controlling
undertaking, and whose employees participate in the
choice of the members of the latter undertaking’s
supervisory board. Should only one nomination be made,
the trade union representatives are chosen by a majority
vote rather than by proportional representation (para 16,
ibid).
Most decisions of a supervisory board set up according
to the quasi-paritative system of codetermination provided
for by the 1976 Act require a simple majority. However, a
two-thirds majority is required in the cases set out in
paragraphs 27, 29 and 31(2) of the Act. By paragraph 27
of the Act, the chairperson of the supervisory board must
be elected by a two thirds majority of the members. Where
such a majority cannot be attained, the shareholders
representatives, who are elected by the general meeting
(para 101 (1) and (2) AktG) elect the chairperson; and the
employees representatives the vice chairperson (para 27 of
the Codetermination Act 1976). This rule explains why
the chairperson, who has a casting vote (para 29(2)
Codetermination Act 1976), is usually a representative of
the shareholders, such that really paritative
codetermination is not attained.
Such parity is obtained when the Coal, Iron and Steel
Codetermination Act 1951 applies. Under this system, the
neutral chairperson is elected by a majority vote of the
shareholders’ and employees’ representatives (para 8(1),
ibid). If the supervisory board has 11 members (it may have
15 or 21 in certain circumstances) at least two of them
must belong to the workforce of the company and two may,
and usually do belong to unions represented in the
undertaking. The fifth member additional to the former
ones must not belong to a trade union or employers
association, or have a service agreement with, or be any
employee of the company, or employ persons on its behalf,
or have a significant interest in it. The same rule applies to
the neutral chairperson and the person additional to the
four shareholders representatives. Proposals for the
appointment of employees’ representatives other than the
two who belong to the workforce must be made by the
executive organs of the relevant trade unions, after making
consultations with their representatives in the undertaking.
The actual nomination of the employees’ representatives is
left to the works Council: the competent organ of the
company is bound by them in accordance with paragraph
6 of the Coal, Iron and Steel Codetermination Act 1951.
According to paragraph 6 of the 1951 Act, the shareholders
representatives are appointed by the competent organ of
the company as provided by the law or the statutes: this
would most usually be the general meeting.
When codetermination in the supervisory board is
governed by the Codetermination Act 2004, it is provided
by paragraph 5 of Part II of that Act that the employees’
representatives on the supervisory board are elected by a
secret and direct vote of all the employees in the
undertaking over the age of 18. Nominations may be made
by the works councils and by at least one tenth of the
eligible employees of the undertaking, by a minimum of
100 employees (para 6 of Part II of the Codetermination
Act 2004).
As already indicated, in principle the election of the
shareholders’ representatives on the supervisory board
takes place in the general meeting. However, the statutes
may provide that a maximum of one-third of the
shareholders’ representatives may be appointed by
shareholders specified in the statutes, or by shareholders
who have particular registered shares which may only be
transferred with the consent of the company (para 101(1)
and (2) AktG). Members of a supervisory board may not be
appointed for a period in excess of approximately five
years; they must be natural persons. An individual may not
serve on more than ten supervisory boards. A person is not
eligible for membership of a supervisory board who is the
legal representative of a dependent company of the relevant
company, or the legal representative of another
undertaking whose supervisory board included a member
of the company’s management board (para 100(2) Nos 2
and 3 AktG).
As in the case with non-executive directors in the
United Kingdom, there has been some criticism of the
quality of some members of the supervisory boards of
German public companies. Paragraph 5.4.1 of the German
Corporate Governance Code contains recommendations
designed to ensure that members of the supervisory board
are of suitable calibre. The Code also recommends that
members of the management board of a listed company
shall not accept more than a total of five supervisory board
posts in non-group listed companies (para 5.4.3 ibid). This
provision reminds one that there is nothing to prevent
former chairpersons or members of the management
board, from becoming members of the supervisory board
of the same company.
Members of the supervisory board may resign or be
removed from office. The removal of members elected by
the shareholders’ meeting which has not been bound by
nominations normally requires a majority of at least three
fourths of the votes cast of the general meeting, but more
stringent conditions may be imposed (para 103(1) AktG).
In the case of particular members elected in accordance
with or designated by the statutes, such members may be
removed by those responsible for their election or
designation. Designated members may be removed by a
simple majority of the votes at the general meeting if they
cease to fulfil the requirements of the statutes (para 103(2)
AktG). A member of the supervisory board may be
removed for good cause by the court on the application of
the supervisory board acting by a simple majority. This rule
is applicable to all the members of the supervisory board 21
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and thus to elected or designated members, and to those
who represent the employees and those who represent the
shareholders (para 103(3) AktG).
Members of the supervisory board who are not
appointed by the general meeting or in accordance with
the statutes, but instead under one of the Codetermination
Acts may be removed under the provisions of the relevant
Act (see para 103(4) AktG; para 23 Codetermination Act
1976; para 10 Coal, Iron and Steel Codetermination Act
1951; and para 76 Works Councils Act 1952).
The appointment of members of the supervisory board
to cover vacancies when a quorum cannot be constituted is
governed by the detailed provisions of paragraph 104 AktG.
According to paragraph 105 AktG, a member of the
supervisory board may not be a member of the
management board, or a permanent deputy member
thereof.
Remuneration and loans
According to paragraph 113 AktG, the members of the
supervisory board may receive remuneration for their
services, which may be determined in the statutes or by the
shareholders’ meeting. Such remuneration must bear a
reasonable relationship to the duties of the members of the
supervisory board and the position of the company. If the
remuneration is determined in the statutes, the
shareholders’ meeting may, by a simple majority, resolve on
the amendment of the statutes so as to reduce the
remuneration.
Paragraph 5.4,5 of the Corporate Governance Code
repeats much of what is contained in Article 113. However
it recommends that the exercise of the chairmanship and
deputy chairmanship of the board and its committees
should be taken into account. It is also recommended by
paragraph 5.4,5 that members of the board shall receive
fixed and performance related remuneration: the latter
should contain elements based upon the long term
performance of the undertaking. The separation into fixed
and performance related components of the remuneration
appears to occur in practice.
It was held in a recent decision of the Supreme Court
(Bundesgerichtshof) that the grant of stock options to
members of the supervisory board was incompatible with
the Aktiengesetz because of the possible danger of conflicts
of interest (see BGH judgment of February 16, 2004 –
IIZR 316/02, [2004] Die AG 265).
The grant of credit to members of the supervisory board
and to spouses, partners and minor children thereof may
only take place with the consent of the board (paras 115(1)
and (2) AktG). Agreements between members of the
supervisory board and the company for the provision of
professional services which do not give rise to an
employment relationship, or an undertaking to perform a
special task require the consent of the supervisory board if
they are to be valid (para 114 AktG).
Procedural rules
The supervisory board decides by resolution. Insofar as
the quorum is not determined by law, it may be by the
statutes (paras 108(1) and (2) AktG). Members may act in
person and in writing, but may not appoint a
representatives to function in their absence (paras 108(3)
and 111/5 AktG). However, according to paragraph 101(3)
AktG a substitute member may be appointed for each
member of the supervisory board to replace them if they
cease to hold office prematurely. By paragraph 107(1), the
supervisory board is required to elect a chairperson and a
deputy chairperson, who has the right and duties of the
chairperson only if the latter is incapacitated.
Meetings of the supervisory board should be called once
in every calendar quarter and must be called in every half-
year. In the case of a listed company, they must be called
twice in each calendar half year (para 110(3) AktG).
Furthermore, every member of the supervisory board or
management board may, upon stating the grounds for such
actions ask the chairperson of the supervisory board to
promptly call a meeting of that board (para 110(1) AktG).
The view has been taken that meetings of the board are
insufficiently frequent. However, certain of the work of the
board may be done by the chairperson or by committees
thereof. Criticisms of the management are often dealt with
in practice by internal discussions between shareholders’
representatives on the supervisory board and the
management.
Unless one of the Codetermination Acts applies,
quorums of the board may be provided for by the
company’s statutes. If the quorum is not stipulated by the
law or by the statutes, it consists of at least one half of the
number of the board, or at least three members thereof
(para 108(3) Aktg). Members of the board should not
exercise a vote on transactions in which they have a
personal interest. Paragraph 5.5.2 of the Corporate
Governance Code recommends that each member of the
board shall inform it of any conflicts of interest which may
result from a consultancy or directorship with clients,
suppliers, lenders or other business partners.
The board may form committees in particular for the
purpose of preparing its deliberations and resolutions and
supervising the execution of the latter. Certain matters may
not, however, be delegated to a committee: these include
the appointment of the chairperson or deputy chairperson;
the advance payment of distributable profits; the
appointment and removal of members of the management
board; the appointment and removal of members of the
management board; the calling or a shareholders’ meeting;
the examination of the financial statements and of the
annual report on relations with connected companies
(verbundene Unternehmen) (para 107(3) AktG. The formation22
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of an audit committee is recommended by paragraph
5.1.2. of the Corporate Governance Code. Paragraph 5.3.3
of the Code, which is evidently intended to state the
existing legal position says that the supervisory board can
delegate questions of the strategy or the undertaking, the
composition of the members of the management board,
and investment and financing to committees. Audit
committees, as well as nomination and remuneration
committees, are increasingly used by German listed
companies.
Functions of the supervisory board and the chairperson
As already indicated above the supervisory board is
responsible for the appointment and dismissal of members
of the management board (para 84(1) AktG). The
management board has to report to the supervisory board
on the matters set out in paragraph 90 AktG. The
chairperson of the supervisory board of a German listed
company is recommended to maintain regular contact with
management board and its chairperson, and consult that
person on strategy, business development and risk
development in the undertaking (see para 5.2 of the
Corporate Governance Code). Paragraph 5.2 also
recommends that the chairperson of the supervisory board
is informed by the chairperson of the management board
without delay of important events which are essential to
the assessment of the situation and development as well as
the management of the undertaking. The chairperson of
the supervisory board shall then inform the supervisory
board, and if required, convene an extraordinary meeting
of that board. These recommendations are clearly intended
to facilitate the flow of information from the management
board and its chairperson to the supervisory board and its
chairperson. This has not always happened satisfactorily in
the past.
According to paragraph 111(1) AktG, the supervisory
board has the task of supervising the management of the
company. Such supervision has not always taken place
satisfactorily where the board has consisted of a large
number of members. Such boards may be favoured by
trade unions, because they obtain a larger number of
representatives therein. Furthermore, the members of
supervisory boards have sometimes previously held
managerial positions with the same company. The
chairman of the supervisory board has thus sometimes
previously held the post of chairman of the management
board. There may in such cases be reason to doubt whether
such members of the supervisory board will exercise
sufficiently independent judgment.
The tasks of the supervisory board are further specified
in paragraph 111(2) AktG, which mention, inter alia, the
inspection and examination of the books and records of
the company. The board is also empowered by paragraph
111(1) AktG to appoint the auditor to audit its annual and
consolidated accounts. This provision owes its origin to the
Control and Transparency Act 1998. Paragraph 111(3)
provides that the supervisory board, acting by a simple
majority, may call a general meeting whenever the interests
of the company so require. Paragraph 111(4) AktG,
provides that managerial tasks cannot be conferred on the
supervisory board, but the statutes or the board must
stipulate that certain transactions can only be entered into
with its consent. If such consent is refused, such refusal
may be overridden by the general meeting (which may be
called at the request of the management board), by a
majority of at least three quarters of the votes cast.
The power given to the supervisory board to represent
the company in and out of court as against the members of
the management board by paragraph 112 AktG does not
only extend to claims against existing members of the
management board but also against former ones. Such
claims may involve expenses claimed by a member of the
management board, or claims in respect of an agreement
concluded with him to make provision for dependents.
The supervisor board may well be reluctant to make claims
against members of the management board, because the
brining of such claims may sometimes indicate that the
supervisory board has not carried out its supervisory tasks
satisfactorily. Actions against members of the supervisory
board may be brought by the management board.
It follows from paragraph 110 and 111 AktG that the
supervisory board has important functions in relation to
the company’s accounts.
Duties and liabilities
Paragraph 116 provides that paragraph 93 regarding the
duty of care and responsibility of the members of the
management board shall apply by way of analogy to the
duty of care and responsibility of the supervisory board.
Further, similar criminal liabilities are imposed on
members of the management board and the supervisory
board by paragraphs 399 (false statements) 400
(misrepresentation) and 404 (breach of duty of
confidentiality). German law governing the assertion of the
company’s damages claims against members of the
management or supervisory boards by members of the
company is unsatisfactory in several respects. Such claims
could not until recently be asserted unless the aggregate
holdings of the claimant shareholders exceed one-
twentieth of the share capital or 500,000 euros in value.
Such claimants may secure the appointment of special
representatives by the court if there are facts which justify
the grave suspicion that the company suffered a loss
through dishonesty or serious breaches of the law or the
statutes (para 147(3) AktG). A recent amendment of the
law, which will come into force on November 1, 2005
(2004 Act on the Furtherance of Corporate Integrity and
the Redemocratisation of the Rules governing
Shareholders’ Claims) will reduce these amounts to 1 per
cent of the share capital or 100, 000 euros. 23
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The present rules relating to costs under German law
are somewhat unsatisfactory: the plaintiff has to bear all the
costs and risks of brining the action. An unsuccessful
shareholder does not only have to bear his or her own costs
and those of their lawyer but also those of the opposing
party (para 147(4) AktG). An alteration in the present
position relating to costs has been suggested and will
remove the risk of costs from the plaintiff as soon as the
action has been admitted by the court, as also has the
abolition of the present requirement for a special
representative. It has also been suggested that there should
no longer be any need for an urgent suspicion of a loss
through dishonesty or gross violations of the law, but
simply a suspicion of such contingencies before an action
might be brought. It is clear that German law is still rather
undeveloped as far as derivative actions are concerned,
FINAL REMARKS
It has been suggested by Professor Hopt that German
companies should be given a choice between adopting a
single and a double board system (see Professor K. Hopt
and P C Leyens, Board Models in Europe, European
Corporate Governance Institute 2004). For political
reasons, such a choice is unlikely to be made available,
except in the limited context of the European Company.
The system of codetermination in the supervisory board
now appears to be deeply entrenched in German political
and social traditions, whatever disadvantages it may have,
which are alleged to include making large German
companies unwelcome to foreign investors.
It appears difficult, owing to the opposition of trade
unions, to enact legal provisions providing for supervisory
boards having fewer members or for the reduction in the
percentage of employee participation.
As already indicated, it appears difficult at present for
members of a German company to bring a derivative action
against members of one of its boards. This remains true
despite recent changes in German law. The rules relating to
the duties of members of their boards may be unclear in
certain respects, and perhaps to require further
codification. Certain of the provisions of the Corporate
Governance Code may well be given statutory authority.
This Code is revised each year.
24
Amicus Curiae Issue 60 July/August 2005
Frank Wooldridge
Formerly Adjunct Professor, University of Notre Dame
